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Abstract 
The term ‘new materialism’ has recently gained saliency as a descriptor for an 
eclectic range of positions that question the human centred and human exclusive 
focus of scholarship across the humanities and social sciences. In turn these 
emerging perspectives have been subject to critique by those writing in the 
established materialist tradition who argue that new materialism ignores the unique 
specificity of human agency and the transformatory capabilities of our species. Our 
previous interventions have endorsed a particular account of posthumanism that 
draws together complexity influenced systems theory with elements of political 
ecologism that have incorporated aspects of established materialist and humanist 
thinking. This article rejects the old materialist critique that denies the emancipatory 
potential of posthumanist thinking, and explores the potential for an emancipatory 
posthumanism. 
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Introduction 
In Tom Robbins’ comic novel, Skinny Legs and All, a series of inanimate objects -- a 
sock, a can of beans, a silver spoon and two ancient and spiritually invested things, a 
painted stick (or self-described ‘navigational instrument’) and a conch shell -- find 
themselves brought together by events and destined to travel together from the 
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American Midwest to Jerusalem. The reader should allay disbelief, cautions Robbins, 
because: 
  
The inertia of objects is deceptive. The inanimate world appears static, ‘dead’ 
to humans only because of our neuromuscular chauvinism. We are so 
enamoured by our own activity range that…We regard the objects that polka-
dot our daily lives as if they were rigid, totally predictable solids, frozen 
inferiority in time and space. (Robbins, 1990, p. 62) 
  
But lo and behold: 
  
A gentle nudge from Conch Shell’s spire punctured the bean can’s musings. 
“We must depart now”, Conch Shell said. “Painted Stick has taken his fix on 
the guide star. “ 
“Hey” yelled Dirty Sock. “Round ‘em up and head ‘em out!” He was certainly 
enjoying himself.  
Spoon popped up tentatively over the gully edge. She was nervous but under 
control. 
Very well, thought Can o’ Beans. On to Jerusalem… 
Under cover of darkness they scooted, toddled and bounced along… 
(Robbins, 1990, p. 63) 
  
Of all the complicated interwoven narratives that make up the book, the travails of 
the internationally travelling objects are most hilarious. We think that some of the 
‘old’ and some of the ‘new’ materialists discussed in this paper might also laugh at 
the antics of these plucky and determined things. They would do so, however, for 
different reasons. For new materialists, accounts of agency that are human centred 
and human exclusive fail to attend to the powers of the non-human world in making 
and remaking our shared world. Robbins, like theorists working within new 
materialism, is perfectly clear that shells and cans of pork and beans cannot speak as 
we humans do, but challenges us to imagine what they might have to say. Yet, there 
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have been strong criticisms of such a position of distributed agency. If we humans 
are simply another node in the relational net of lively matter then how exactly can 
we be seen to act in and on the world, in particular, in the pursuit of human projects 
of emancipation? For old materialists, the laugh is that the contents of a comic novel 
and a book on political theory might show such striking resemblance.  
We have recently made a call for a Posthuman International Relations. As such, 
our work has been associated with ‘new materialism’ (Chandler, 2013). It is worth 
noting that ideas about which ideas and positions might be ‘posthumanist’, and 
which might be ‘new materialist’ are often used interchangeably by many authors 
identifying with such positions, and also by their critics (see for example, Braidotti, 
2013; Schmidt, 2013). Whilst we are not quite convinced that the overlap is as tight as 
some suggest, in this paper we examine some examples of posthumanist/new 
materialist positions and their challenge to humancentred notions of the political.  
As Diana Coole and Samantha Frost suggest (2010: 1), in the light of the 
“massive materiality” that makes us up in our embodied condition as human 
animals - embedded in webs of dependencies and relations with myriad other 
species and forms of ‘matter’, produced and reproduced by social and economic 
structures that shape our everyday existences - how could we be anything other than 
‘materialists’?. The new materialist turn has also been given added impetus by the 
development of controversial political issues which involve the politics of matter – 
such as climate change or applications of biotechnology. We see this broadening out 
of concern with the material as a positive move towards more inclusive and less 
parochial social science. Yet whilst we might concur with Coole and Frost that we 
are increasingly ‘all’ materialists now, they underplay the contention around the 
notion of the material. 
For some, perhaps ‘old materialists’, the increasing influence of new 
materialism has been a matter for concern. In particular, the eclectic and often 
slippery perspectives that constitute new materialism have been seen to undermine 
the potency of older more established materialist positions, particularly those 
associated with Marxism.  Here, we consider arguments that new materialism 
ignores the unique specificity of human agency and the transformatory capabilities 
of our species. Interestingly, for some advocates of posthumanism, and for some 
critics, the division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ materialism is dichotomous – it concerns 
ontological incompatibility. Criticisms of our own work have alluded to this and 
suggested that we are ‘bolting on’ complexity analysis to a normative political 
project that is decidedly humanist (for example, Edelmann, 2012). Our previous 
4 
 
interventions have certainly endorsed a particular account of posthumanism that 
draws together complexity influenced systems theory with elements of political 
ecologism that have incorporated aspects of established materialist and humanist 
thinking. This article explores the potential for a number of political projects within a 
posthumanist frame. In doing so, we reject the old materialist critique that denies the 
emancipatory potential of posthumanist thinking; and question those positions in 
new materialism that tend towards biological determinism and which have been 
largely responsible for generating these critiques.  
 
Varieties of New Materialism and the Challenge to Humanist Politics 
At one level, the intellectual project of new materialism is to insist on a reconfiguring 
of our ideas about the social, economic and political as a result of developments in 
the natural sciences that have disturbed nineteenth century certainties about the 
nature of the material world (Coole and Frost, 2010: 5-7). This project is a broad and 
a contested one. In this section, we discuss the range of approaches in 
posthumanism/new materialism, but first, we begin by considering what might be 
common strands.  
 
‘Ten Tenets of the New Materialism’  
While William Connolly (2013a, pp. 399-402) suggests that there are ten 
distinguishing features which unite the various very different new materialist 
approaches, we suggest that these can be grouped under three main headings.  
First, the radical ontological claim of the new materialism is the priority given 
to matter. Matter, and in particular its self-organising capabilities becomes the centre 
of attention. This leads to a rejection of a mind and body distinction. All things, 
living and non-living, are constituted of the same basic elements. Connolly describes 
this ontological position as a ‘protean monism’. Matter is therefore (drawing on 
complexity thinking) imbued with a dynamic quality which contains self-organising 
capacity, such that there is a tendency for ever more complex formations to appear. 
Matter is not seen as ‘dead’ but as containing energy-matter complexes which are 
constantly in flux. 
 A second area of concern relates to the implications of thinking within new 
materialism. Connolly advocates a ‘speculative realism’. This rejects 
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postmetaphysical approaches (that is, those demonstrating reflexivity in their use of 
Enlightenment categories such as ‘reason’) in favour of a ‘contestable metaphysic 
and cosmology’. This stresses the dynamic character of matter such that an 
awareness is demonstrated of ‘differential periods of stability, being and relative 
equilibrium in this or that zone while coming to terms with periods of real disequilibrium and 
becoming’ (Connolly, 2013, p. 400, emphasis in original). This disjuncture between 
periods of stability and instability has epistemological issues which challenge 
traditional approaches for understanding human and non-human processes. As a 
result a ‘problem orientation’ is needed. Likewise the new materialism challenges 
human-centred ways of thinking. While humans may not be the centre of things, 
Connolly argues that they think more profoundly about their situation than other 
species. This, he argues, doesn’t excuse humanity from thinking about its position in 
the context of a wider set of relations with the rest of nature, rather, it heightens this 
responsibility. 
Third, the acknowledgement of the subjectivity of humanity in a world where 
the human isn’t necessary prompts Connolly to advocate the development of an ‘ethic 
of cultivation’. Such an ethic needs to be located both at the level of the individual 
and within institutions. Additionally our focus of attention needs to be wider than 
the local, which Connolly describes as ‘the sufficiency of cultural internalism’. While 
the focus can’t be everything, all of the time, there is a requirement to be aware of 
the embedded character of phenomena and the levels of analysis in which it is 
possible to investigate. Ultimately our concerns should be at the planetary level. 
Such a focus also prompts us to be aware that there may be things beyond our 
comprehension – and such issues, politics being one, oblige experimental action.    
  As noted, Connolly advocates a speculative realism. This is a philosophical 
realism as opposed to a political realism. And it is a realism of a very specific sort. 
While it maintains that there is a physical world of which we can have knowledge, it 
denies a separation between us as observers and material objects. The mind is an 
emergent feature of the body. It is speculative in the sense of acknowledging an 
awareness to the limits of our knowledge. This acknowledges a central 
unknowableness to existence related to the difficulties in understanding processes of 
self-organisation. Connolly (2013b, p. 77) argues that “we are beings flopping 
around in one corner of a cosmos that exceeds our capacity for knowledge, self-
awareness, and mastery”. As a result speculative realism “folds a fungible element 
of mystery into its philosophy” (Connolly 2013b, p. 9).  
6 
 
Connolly is keen to emphasise the common underpinnings of new 
materialism and we concur with his ‘ten tenets’ as a useful definitional starting 
point. Yet these ten tenets have given rise to a plethora of positions, and these have 
marked differences. There is a spectrum of approaches to posthumanism that might 
be considered to be more or less critical in focus and give rise to rather different 
political projects. One of the reasons for this is that Connolly’s ten tenets do not 
indicate the divergences between different ontological positions implied by the 
divergences in, for example, complexity thinking. As we have found, there is “no 
unified theory of complexity” (Bertuglia and Vaio, 2005, p. 315). The term can be 
used to describe a variety of theoretical positions which draw upon a similar 
conceptual lexicon while having radically different epistemological and ontological 
perspectives. Elsewhere we have identified four different ways in which complexity 
theory has been applied in the social sciences (Cudworth and Hobden, 2009).  
Our own engagement with complexity has been general and philosophical, 
and built around three interdependent concepts we have found particularly useful: 
complex adaptive systems, self-organisation and emergence (see Cudworth and 
Hobden, 2011). Our selection of these concepts has a number of motivations which 
have led us to develop a particular perspective within new materialism. While 
Connolly uses complexity in a reinvention of pluralism, we use it to very different 
ends. There is then, we suggest, a plurality of posthumanisms, some of which, we 
will now explore.  
 
Varieties of posthumanist political theory 
The term posthumanism has been understood in a variety of different ways (Wolfe, 
2010, p.xi).  In line with Connolly’s ‘ten tenets’ however, a clear common theme in 
posthumanist scholarship would be to say that it represents a reaction against the 
view of human exceptionalism (or anthropocentrism). This view understands 
humanity to be marked off from the huge diversity of non-human animal life due to 
‘exceptional characteristics’, such as the possession of syntactical language or of ‘free 
will’.  
One strand of new materialism/posthumanism might be referred to as ‘new 
vitalism’. The latter has been particularly associated with the influence of Gilles 
Deleuze, who did not consider himself a materialist but rather, was concerned that 
his work be understood as vitalist (Coole and Frost, 2010: 9). In political work, this 
7 
 
position is best illustrated by the ‘enchanted’ or ‘vital’ materialism of Jane Bennett 
(2010) who argues that inorganic matter such as kerbside litter (trash) or an 
electricity grid, all exhibit force and vitality rendering them active, productive and 
self-creating. Bennett argues for a vital materialism in order to recognize the role of 
apparently inanimate matter affecting and configuring situations and events. In vital 
materialism there is a tendency to minimize the differences between subjects and 
objects with this notion of a vitality which runs through both human and non-
human matter. The end in view is the development of a more environmentally 
aware and cautious politics, but the elevation of the “shared materiality of all things” 
does seem to be a rather blunt instrument in securing this end. Bennett’s notion of 
‘thing power’ understands agentic capacity as distributed, apparently equally, 
“across a range of ontological types.” (2004: 347-72).   
There are difficulties here both of conceptual conflation and lack of clarity. 
For Bennett, non-human assemblages can act. However, what she actually seems to 
mean is that assemblages can have an impact or effect on humans and non-humans. 
Here, Bennett is conflating the idea of the properties and powers of beings and 
things, and the notion of action and the idea of agency, and there are serious 
questions to be raised about her assumption that a distributed concept of agency will 
be effective in unsettling humancentric politics (Bennett, 2010, p.13).   
The second approach, hybridization, is best illustrated by the contributions of 
Bruno Latour, for whom the social world is an assembly of material entities and 
processes which is constituted through the interactions of all kinds of matter (human 
and non-human) in the form of networks. Latour (1993) describes the emergence of 
apparently modern Western societies through the interaction of two processes – 
purification and hybridization. The processes of purification involve the separation 
of the human world from the world of things and the construction of the world of 
nature and its scientific study; separate from the study of the social world with its 
selves, cultures and politics. Yet, Latour argues, the human social world has never 
been pure, despite all the attempts to extricate it from the world of nature. However 
‘modern’ we think we are, our world is one of relative degrees of hybridization as 
we are caught in networks of interactions and relations between what Latour would 
understand as more or less natural and more or less social phenomena. Within these 
networks, non-human matter can be understood as ‘actant’. This is both a counter to 
humancentric prejudice, and reflects our reality as one of the multitude of species 
situated in a range of ‘attachments’ on planet earth (Latour, 2009, pp. 72-84).  
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Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT) holds that agency may be attributed to 
any object or ‘actant’, temporarily constituted by the emergent web of “materially 
heterogeneous relations” (Law, 2009, p.71). Here, as with the vital materialist 
position, agency is inflated conceptually (so that it becomes simply a capacity for 
action) and extensively (so that anything that has an effect on something else is seen 
as an actant, from fishermen to scallops). However, the difficulty with Latour is that 
in his broad sweep, all agency is understood as of the same quality. In addition, it is 
a property of ‘things’ rather than, as complexity thinking suggests, of systems in 
relation. Like Latour, we want to be able to discuss the ways that all kinds of 
creatures, beings and things, bound up in relations of complex systems and relations 
with their system environments, and are agential in the sense that they might “make 
a difference in the world” (Giddens, 1984). Both Latour and Bennett can be seen as 
subscribing to a position of agential realism. Here, the agency of matter, distributed 
across the world of ‘being’ makes up the beings, things and relations of which our 
world is composed. In both hybridity and vitalism, there is a tendency to 
horizontalism – relations are not understood to exist in a context of hierarchies of 
power. The flat, non-hierarchical networks for ANT cannot deal with power because 
it cannot make distinctions between nature and society, or between humans, other 
animals, plants and objects. In theorizing power, we consider that need such 
distinction between different kinds of being and objects in the world in order to 
recognise, for example that distinction such as those between humans and all other 
‘animals’ are forged through and continue to carry, relations of inequality and 
domination. It is this flattening of social relations which old materialists find so 
objectionable in new materialist approaches.  
Our own complexity engagements have led us down a very different route 
wherein we have been interested in the relations between stability and change, and 
the resilience of complex systems. We have remained committed to many of the 
insights of the varieties of political ecologism and have advanced a notion of 
‘complex ecologism’ in trying to understand the current social formations of what, 
after Haraway, we would call ‘naturecultures’. This uses complexity theory with its 
notions of co-existing, interrelated, multi-levelled systems to capture the ontological 
depth of relational systems of social domination (of colonialism, capitalism, 
patriarchy and so on) and their intersections. Complex ecologism assumes the co-
constitution and co-evolution of social and natural systems in dynamic 
configurations (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011: 110-139). Whilst we have 
acknowledged that human communities of all kinds live in relations of dependency 
and reciprocity within complex natural/social systems with non-human beings, 
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things and processes, we have stressed the domination of non-human nature under 
certain kinds of relations and the ways in which certain groups of relatively 
privileged humans are able to assert domination over certain other kinds of human, 
other animal and life forms.  
  Drawing on Margaret Archer’s (2000) discussions of primary and corporate 
agency, and on Nickie Charles and Bob Carter’s use of Archer’s work (Carter and 
Charles, 2011), we have developed a three-fold approach to thinking about structure 
and agency that allows us to think about agency beyond the human (Cudworth and 
Hobden, 2013). First, reproductive agency acknowledges the way in which agential 
beings, both human and non-human, emerge into a pre-existent web of social 
relations and unequally distributed power and resources and their practices over 
time reproduce those situational constraints with relatively minor alterations. 
Second, there is transformative agency where humans and possibly some other 
creatures engage in a struggle over resources and social organization to effect 
differences in that distribution. The human world overlaps with innumerable non-
human systems, both animate and inanimate, which can impact and influence, and 
indeed radically change the structures of the human world. We describe this as 
‘affective agency’. As we will later see, some consider an understanding of our 
embedding in ‘natural’ systems as subjecting humanity to the rule of blind necessity. 
This is reflected in some posthumanist work. The title for John Gray’s controversial 
Straw Dogs comes from the Tao Te Ching, wherein “Heaven and Earth are ruthless 
and treat the myriad creatures as straw dogs” to be trampled on and destroyed 
similarly to the straw effigies offered to the gods in ancient Chinese rituals (Gray, 
2002, p. 33-34). We would concur with Gray that exclusive humanism is arrogant 
and ignores our shared vulnerability with other creatures, but do not think that 
humans are ‘straw dogs’. Rather, we consider the agency of non-human species to be 
constricted in the extreme and that privileged groups of humans exercise 
considerable power over the lives of human and non-human animals and intervene 
dramatically and often disastrously in non-human lifeworlds.  
We have argued for a conception of differentiated agency in which the 
agential being of non-human animals, particularly mammals is countenanced, and 
the possibilities for agency very much depends on the relational systems which 
produce such being. We would use affective agency to discuss the significant effects 
of natural systems and the beings and things caught up in them and in their relations 
with other systems. This is not simply the causal powers of a being or thing but a 
systemic impact that is collective and significant. By significant, we mean that it 
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‘makes a difference in the world’, that it alters the systemic conditions, the agential 
landscape, for other beings and things. The impact of global warming, or the effects 
of a viral pandemic would be examples here. Whereas hybridity and vital 
materialism consider agency simply to be a quality of material existence, our 
conception of agency incorporates the idea that non-human life and non-human 
animals are social actors able to exercise agency without seeing agency simply as a 
capacity that material beings can exercise. We need a situated and differentiated 
notion of agency that understands the ability of creatures and things to ‘make a 
difference in the world’ as a question of situated relations rather than intrinsic capacity 
alone. 
 These discussions of theorizing the social, and potentially political, agency of 
beyond-human life have posed a challenge to politics-as-usual. Perhaps not 
unsurprisingly, the challenge has been resisted and it is in our view most 
unfortunate that some critics seem set on constituting a dichotomy rather than a 
continuum of positions on ‘the material’ and in straight-jacketing certain 
perspectives to either a politics of stasis, one of neo-liberalism or one of 
emancipation. 
 
Resisting the Challenge to Humanist Politics 
There are some very set against the challenge of ‘new’ materialism. In many cases, 
these appear to be ‘old’ materialists disturbed by the apparent uncertainty implied 
by post-materialist analyses. As Connolly suggests, this lies in a partial reading of 
the range of new materialism(s): 
 
A philosophy of becoming set on several tiers of temporality does not, though 
some fools project such a conclusion into it, postulate a world in which every- 
thing is always in radical flux. That would mean that you could never act 
upon one desire before it was replaced by another. The projection of such a 
judgement into the new materialism means that the projector has so far only 
heard one part of the thesis being advanced. (Connolly, 2013a, p.401) 
 
However, this track has been the chosen route of critique. New materialists, David 
Chandler argues, celebrate human embeddedness in the non-human world. Their 
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perspective is to engage with an ethics of becoming, where knowledge can only 
illuminate what is happening rather than predict what is to come. This, for Chandler 
(2013a, p. 527) is “far too high” a price to pay, and one for which “the prize on offer 
is a false one”. The reason for this, Chandler (2013a, p. 528) argues, is because it 
removes our subjectivity as human beings; “we can never be human subjects, 
collectively understanding, constituting and transforming our world”. New 
materialist approaches suggest that we live in a world of becoming, where it is the 
connections and inter-relations that take priority, as a result the ontological focus is 
“objects transforming objects – rather than subjects transforming objects” (2013a, p. 
529).  
There are two interrelated implications Chandler highlights. First is that we 
are subject to the “rule of blind necessity”, where our options become those of a 
micro politics, the transformation of the self as a more ecologically aware embedded 
being. Second, and most importantly, this move, Chandler claims, puts us beyond 
the world of the knowable. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, who argued that the world 
that could be understandable marks the limits of what we should consider, he 
argues that the unpredictability implied by New Materialism leads to “a desert”, and 
as such removes “the meaningfulness of the world itself” (Chandler 2013a, p. 534). 
When we lose the possibility of engaging meaningfully in the world “we lose the 
freedom of the goal-determining subject” (Chandler, 2013b, p. 18). In a world where 
the predictability of our actions is limited we become incapable of action (Chandler, 
2013a, p. 525). Human freedom is only possible through the overcoming of necessity, 
and for this, Chandler (2013b, p. 6) argues we need fixed understandings: “it is 
through these fixed structures of meaning that we understand ourselves as able to 
master necessity – the relations of cause and effect”.  
If only our political intentions were so straightforwardly realisable in their 
outcomes! Surely, even if one has never chanced upon any of the ideas of complexity 
theory, new materialism, posthumanism and the like, the simple point that political 
ends are often at odds with the intentions of actors has become abundantly clear in 
the impact of radical politics in the last century, whatever the quality of the 
understandings of the world on which political interventions were founded. It is 
interesting that Chandler endorses Lenin’s engagement with questions of freedom 
and necessity somewhat approvingly. The outcomes of the Russian Revolution of 
October 1917 are well-debated, but the notion that the revolution was in many 
aspects ‘betrayed’ by consequent developments is now widely accepted - albeit that 
Emma Goldman’s contemporary observations were harshly received: 
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Try as I might I could find nowhere any evidence of benefits received either 
by the workers or the peasants from the Bolshevik régime.  
On the other hand, I did find the revolutionary faith of the people broken, the 
spirit of solidarity crushed, the meaning of comradeship and mutual 
helpfulness distorted. (Goldman, 1923, p.8) 
 
That the outcomes of our actions may be different from our intentions, or in 
Morin’s (2008, p. 96) terms that “action escapes the will of the actor,” is far from a 
novel idea. Yet while complexity thinking has often focussed on the problems 
confronting policy makers (Forrester, 1971), there is a developing literature on policy 
making under conditions of complexity. Sandra Mitchell (2009), for example, 
suggests replacing traditional ‘predict’ and ‘act’ policies with processes of scenario 
evaluation and ‘adaptive management’. In a similar vein, Robert Axelrod and 
Michael Cohen (1999) argue that not only is it possible to make policy under 
conditions of complexity, complexity itself can be actively harnessed in pursuit of 
goals. While the analysis of policy making, and the development of policy making 
when confronted by complexity is a recent development, the point is that this would 
be a rejection of the idea that in complexity we confront a situation of ‘blind 
necessity’.  
Chandler’s claim is that the “rule of blind necessity” prescribes our options in 
terms of a micro politics.  This, he suggests, involves the transformation of the self 
into a more ecologically aware embedded being. This individualist response to 
ecological crises is certainly present in the literature on political ecology, associated 
particularly with the work of Arne Naess (1979) and Warwick Fox (1995) but has 
been effectively critiqued by left and feminist political ecologisms (for example, 
Gorz, 1994;  Soper, 1996). Part of the problem is the narrow selection of new 
materialists on which Chandler focuses his attention (Bennett, Connolly and Latour). 
In addition, he over-compares the similarities between approaches and the political 
projects they advance. Whilst his arguments about a politics of being and stasis 
might work for Bennett, they do not work so well for Latour, for example.  Schmidt 
(2013: 177-78) makes no distinction at all between the “general positions and 
assumptions” of the wider range of posthumanist positions she references.  
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A better example for Chandler’s argument for posthumanism as a politics of 
being-in-the-world in face of ecotastrophe would be John Gray, who, following 
Lovelock and his ilk, considers that the current impact of humanity on patterns of 
change in natural systems, means that we might be simply tossed aside as a species 
unfit for purpose in the earth system. Gray (2002) smirks at the demise of arrogant 
humankind, and the flawed humanist political projects we insist on holding onto; 
dismissing what we would call critical posthumanism as ‘green humanism’ that 
reflects the same naïve doctrine of the possibilities for human salvation. For Gray, 
we, along with Schmidt and Chandler, are like poor deluded and despairing 
Nietzsche, “trapped in the chalk circle of Christian hope” (Gray, 2002, p. 48). Gray 
however, is not quite the secularist he often considers himself to be. More recently, 
and drawing on non-Western political thought, Gray (2013) suggests that we might 
address our arrogant humancentredness by learning silence and the art of simply 
‘being’. This, certainly, is a recommendation for doing nothing in the face of 
potential calamity.  
Chandler suggests that such a politics of stasis is the outcome of new 
materialism and an intrinsic element of a posthumanist position. But it is not. There 
are as many political paths for posthumanisms as for the humanisms of modernity. 
This is something that neither Chandler nor Schmidt can acknowledge, for it is on a 
homogenous new materialism that any argument rests. Both the politics of 
humanism and of posthumanism can be deployed for liberal, left and other forms of 
political project. For neither Latour, nor Connolly, nor those with more radical 
perspectives (feminist or de-development, or indeed, our own), accept that creatures 
are straw dogs. We are all acutely aware however, of the ‘fragility’ of human and 
non-human lifeworlds, it is this shared vulnerability of the living which is the 
grounds of separation from the humancentric modernism of Chandler, Schmidt, 
Lenin and Francis Fukyama! Schmidt (2013) is obviously hostile to environmental 
politics, using some ideas about climate change policy (drawn entirely from liberal 
international institutions) “in dialogue” with new materialism in order to assert that 
the epistemological underpinnings of the latter make it possible for it to “become 
aligned” with neo-liberal international governance. The ontology of modernity and 
the certainties of realist or positivist epistemologies led to a range of contested 
pathways towards very different futures. The future may be less certain for new 
materialisms but the notion of desirable change is still as deeply contested, and what 
might be done is not easily read-off from a new materialist and posthumanist 
analysis in the way which Schmidt suggests, but depends on what kind of 
posthumanist position we are speaking of. 
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Some Posthumanist Political Projects 
The posthumanist critique raises vital questions for human being in the world and 
demands qualitative and quantitative shifts “in our thinking about what exactly is 
the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to 
the other inhabitants of this planet” (Braidotti, 2013, p.2). While we might endorse 
Rosi Braidotti’s sentiments, it needs to be acknowledged that both the analyses 
emerging within posthumanism/new materialism and the political projects these 
positions imply or endorse cover a range of political positions.  
 
A conservative politics of attachments 
For Latour (2005), a huge, unknowable multiplicity of realities exists. Each actor has 
their own ‘world’ and this provides the source of agency and their inspiration for 
action. In turn, Latour is sceptical of political claims for the existence of overarching 
systemic relations of power and inequality around which emancipatory politics has 
coalesced. 
Latour’s most obvious attack on emancipatory politics is contained in his 2004 
paper on the problems of critique within science and technology studies. Here, he 
suggests that around ninety per cent of social critique fall into two approaches “the 
fact position and the fairy position” (2004a, p. 237).  The fact position holds that 
‘objects of belief’ are merely concepts onto which power is projected; while the fairy 
position argues that individuals are dominated by external forces (such the 
operation of capitalism or of gender relations) that may by covertly effective without 
the awareness of those whose behaviour is affected (2004a, p. 238). In the latter, 
critique is straightforward, and any evidence which might contract a theoretical 
certainly is explained away by unseen forces so that “You’re always right!” (2004a, 
p. 239). While both positions have their attendant difficulties, it is the ‘fairy’ position 
which seems most irksome to Latour.   
We require a new way of conceptualising ‘nature’. Nature is not an obvious 
domain of reality, and we have a false dichotomy between the nonhuman and 
human that needs to be reassembled (Latour, 2004b). In doing this, we need to 
constitute a political community incorporating humans and non-humans and 
building on the experiences of the sciences as they are practiced. Moving beyond the 
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modernist institutions of ‘mononaturalism’ and ‘multiculturalism’, Latour develops 
the idea of ‘multilateralism’. This is Latour’s notion of the ‘good life’, one which in 
an interview he described as “the composition of a common world” (Latour and 
Navaran, 2011). Latour has more recently moved away from issues of representation 
and deliberation to political culture and in particular, seeing if traditional ways of 
seeing the world might shed light on and add legitimacy to arguments for a non-
modern posthuman politics. Latour has invoked a more traditional conservatism 
drawing on ideas about ‘respect for creation’ within the Orthodox Christian tradition 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Latour and Naravane, 2011). For Latour, the threat of 
environmental collapse is strong, and engendering public emotion is necessary to 
secure the political consideration of our attachments to the nonhuman lifeworld and 
thereby secure ourselves. This return to religion however seems a retreat to a 
cultural politics of engendering ecological selves. Rejuvenating declining cultural 
mores to invigorate concern about the more-than-human world would appear to be 
a project doomed from the start. 
 
Complex pluralism 
 William Connolly echoes in some ways, the earlier project of Latour - using 
new materialism as a frame within which to recast a liberal pluralist political project. 
Here, he is very much attuned to the concern of political alienation highlighted by 
Schmidt and Chandler. For Connolly (2013b, pp. 181-2), the desire to abandon 
electoral politics is understandable given how dysfunctional it is – yet deserting 
democratic means leaves the field to the right who consistently attempt to depict 
politics as a dysfunctional realm. Hence while forsaking democracy for Connolly is 
not an option, at the same time, working within democratic systems as currently 
constituted only allows limited possibilities for change.  
 The resolution to this conundrum lies, Connolly (2103b, p. 182) argues in a 
politics of ‘micro-experimentation on several fronts’. Here he is advocating the 
possibilities that aggregated small changes to behaviour can result in large political 
changes. When role behaviour conforms to expectations this can act to legitimise 
current sets of arrangements, whilst ‘large-scale role experimentations can make a 
difference on their own and help to set preconditions for constituency participation in 
more robust political movements’ (Connolly, 2013b p. 184, emphasis in original). It is the 
cumulative power of such role experimentation and challenges to the existing order 
that is significant in creating a ‘pluralist assemblage’. At critical moments, such as 
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political disorder or economic chaos movements appear which reveal further the 
cracks within the existing order – promoting yet further role experimentation.  
 We can see clear overlaps with Latour’s liberal project here, although these 
pluralist assemblages appear more open to the influence of social movement activity 
and the engagement of extra-parliamentary pressure in policy fora. In thinking 
about the presence of cracks in political order and the insertion of scientific (and 
other) expertise, these ideas could be linked to (neo)liberal forms of environmental 
governance. This is not to be associated with new materialism (as per Schmidt) but 
with liberalism. Current policy initiatives reflect the concerns of complex pluralism 
as articulated by Connolly. For example, in the UK the creation of what might be 
seen as a ‘new’ posthuman political settlement has been advocated by Nicholas Stern 
(2009). Stern’s argument for a new ‘global deal’ via which we move to a carbon 
neutral economy can be read as a reflection of neo-liberal governance, guided by 
common-sense principles of effectiveness, efficiency and fairness, and an 
overarching framework of the ‘greening’ of the capitalist system and the liberal state. 
At the heart of his work is the simple calculation that, if the science of climate change 
is right, the cost of doing nothing about global warming would be very high, while 
the cost of transforming our energy system would be relatively low. Stern’s policy 
measures are a series of corrections to market failures and externalities by using 
regulations to encourage market mechanisms to reduce emissions.  
The ‘greening of capitalism’ is Stern’s project, perhaps shared by Connolly. 
Even these ideas of low-carbon development and re-invigoration of democracy for 
ends both human and beyond represent however, not the cultivation of the 
environmental self, but a re-orientation of public policy. They do not represent the 
incapacity of politics. Other posthumanist positions lend themselves to progressive 
political projects outside the liberal frame. Here, it has been suggested that 
exploitative and oppressive relations exist and must be taken seriously, and that 
their challenge has seen the emergence of a post-humanist polities allied to the 
politics of emancipation, albeit one which stresses the notion that ‘freedom’ is both 
embodied and embedded. 
 
Critical Posthumanism 
We would define critical posthumanism as approaches to more-than-human politics 
which draw on aspects of critical theory and thereby contain an agenda for 
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transformation.  In developing a politics of emancipation however, it is important to 
remember that much radical politics of liberation draws very heavily on the same 
European Enlightenment humanism which informed a model of political and 
cultural universalism that has had disastrous consequences for many peoples and 
non-human lifeworlds. But does a problematizing of the liberal and Enlightenment 
foundations of emancipatory agendas mean that they cannot be disentangled from 
the imperialist mission of Western civilization? Does a new materialism involve the 
rejection of any kind of emancipatory agenda as Chandler and Schmidt suggest? 
Many of us working within the posthumanist critique wish to advance an 
agenda which opposes the domination of life in all its variety. Yet as emancipatory 
politics has learned to its cost, there are many dangers in universalist schemas of all 
kinds and conceptions of liberty, rights, wellbeing and so on are fraught with 
contradiction. This is why in our own work, we have emphasised the importance of 
social intersectionality as an analytic frame. Our use of posthumanism is to indicate 
the understanding of ‘humanity’ as embedded in networks of relations of 
dependency with the non-human lifeworld, to emphasise the fragility of embodied 
life. In addition, we want to emphasise the importance of a posthumanist lens in 
examining phenomena which, in international politics, are often seen as exclusively 
human such as the practice of war, the delivery of welfare and security, the 
distribution of resources and so on. Humanism might sensibly appreciate the 
qualities of the human animal, but we would hope it might radically consider the 
extent to which these are entirely unique given the multiplicity of species. A critical 
humanism must also abandon its history of humancentrism and be highly attuned to 
the domination of the animal that is not human, in addition to the animal which is.  
Work in the areas of de-development and eco-feminism provide a starting 
point for our own perspective. From a de-development perspective, such as 
advocated by Wolfgang Sachs (2008a, 2008b), there is a need to completely re-think 
forms of social organisation. For Sachs (1992) the notion of development “stands like 
a ruin in the intellectual landscape”. In its place there is a need for a radically 
different path, particularly in the wealthier parts of the world. This way of life 
requires a prioritisation of the carrying capacity of the planet, and the envisioning of 
lifestyles within that capacity. Val Plumwood shares Sachs’ concerns with the 
impacts of development on the planet and its capacity to support life. In terms of our 
relationship with the rest of nature her view is that notions of human domination 
over nature “must end either with the death of the other on whom he relies, and 
therefore with his own death, or with the abandonment of mastery, his failure and 
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transformation” (Plumwood, 1993, p. 196). While Sachs advocates a de-development 
agenda, Plumwood argues for a reconsideration of our place within the rest of 
nature. Drawing on the political frameworks of indigenous Australian and North 
American cultures she argues for a non-colonial posthuman politics which develops 
a culture of belonging and community (as opposed to a prioritisation of conquest 
and private property), and on flourishing (to replace a western obsession with 
wealth). For Plumwood, a posthuman politics is not some form of pre-modern 
exchange with the modern, but rather, a re-working of elements of humanist politics 
of emancipation alongside non-Western and non-capitalist conceptions (Plumwood, 
2002; also Salleh, 1997). 
Paraphrasing probably the most quoted sentiment in International Relations, 
Ken Booth (2011, p. 329) has described Critical Theory as ‘for the potential 
community of mankind and for the purpose of emancipation’. A critical 
posthumanism, we would suggest is for all that lives, and for the purpose of 
eliminating multiple forms of oppression. How might this be considered part of an 
emancipatory programme? 
First it provides a form of analysis which stresses the common constitution of 
all living things. A systems analysis derived from complexity theory allows for the 
analysis of the interactions between human and non-human systems and between 
animate and in-animate systems. This forms the basis of an ethic of care and 
responsibility which does not cease at the species border. One of the central 
contributions of posthumanist work has been to question the character of these 
boundaries, and in particular to raise questions about those features which humans 
have declared indicate their uniqueness, such as tool use, or use of language. The 
intention here is to de-centre the position of the human. This is not to deny the 
planetary significance of human activity, but to indicate that many other species also 
possess capabilities once thought the sole preserve of humans.  
While we don’t regard our particular position to be one directed towards 
policy making, the implications of thinking about our actions are part of the 
emancipatory programme. In particular in thinking about policy issues we have 
suggested that a precautionary principle should dominate, a greater humility in 
terms of our embeddedness in non-human nature, and a priority towards the 
building of resilience within systems rather than the undermining of resilience. Both 
the de-development literature and the eco-feminist literature alluded to above 
indicate a requirement for a total re-constitution of our economic and social 
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arrangements. This is a view with which we would concur. Intra-human and inter-
species forms of domination are exacerbated by the capitalist systems and a more 
equitable form of social system could be a significant move towards alleviating both 
of these. How such a transition would be achieved is more problematic, and the 
posthuman perspective would not envisage a programmatic overthrow of 
capitalism, but rather change through small actions particularly as a result of 
increased awareness about forms of intra and inter-species domination. In this sense 
we see the posthuman move as being at home within the discipline of International 
Relations – which is a discipline which takes change at a global level as a central 
concern, though which to-date, in our opinion has been weak in terms of its 
contribution to understanding global environmental issues.  
 
Conclusion 
This article refutes the claim that in a complex world we confront blind necessity and 
that in acknowledging complexity we are incapacitated from moving towards a 
more just and equitable world. Certainly one conclusion that can be drawn from 
complexity is that any action is futile because we confront a situation of radical 
unpredictability. Indeed, this would appear to be the standpoint of John Gray who 
would see human attempts to improve their position as misguided. However that is 
not the only conclusion, rather, there is a growing body of literature on policy-
making under complexity as well as some radical ideas for the re-invention of our 
world. Without a doubt it would be easier to make progress in a world where there 
was a predictable link between our actions and their outcomes. Yet, we argue, it is 
better to try to learn with complexity than to pretend that it is not there. 
The claim that we exist in a condition of complexity is an ontological one, not 
an ethical one. However, an ethical position can be derived from a starting point in 
complexity. Complexity points to the overlapping and inter-connected character of 
human and non-human systems. This, we suggest, indicates the embedded character 
of human activity. Humans are not the independent separated beings of some 
religious and humanist claims. Furthermore an embeddedness in the rest of nature 
implies a need not only to prioritise our relations to the rest of nature, but also of our 
common origins with the rest of non-human nature. While it may be in human self-
interest to protect the rest of non-human nature, our shared heritage with the rest of 
lively matter points to a responsibility to minimise forms of oppression with the 
other forms of life on the planet. In most posthuman perspectives, creatures share 
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vulnerabilities but they are not ‘straw dogs’. For critical posthumanism there can 
also be emancipation and indeed, this is its ethical project.   
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